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Purpose: The paper aims to assess methods and information technologies used to control and 
surveil citizens in light of measures taken to combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus out-
break. That assessment pays particular attention to the right to privacy, which seems not to be 
observed by both private market entities and state authorities. The paper attempts to determine 
the importance of privacy concerning civil liberties and in the context of building a democratic 
society.  
Design/Methodology/approach: The paper is based primarily on research conducted using 
the desk research method. The subject of analysis is data available, inter alia, in scientific 
papers and special reports regarding opportunities and practices used to obtain information 
about Internet users and mobile communication device holders concerning combating the 
spread of the COVID-19 epidemic. Materials covering the pandemic period will be juxtaposed 
with documents showing the relevant periods before the outbreak began.  
Findings: Analysis results are presented in the context of a broader discussion regarding the 
relation between security and civil liberties.     
Practical implications: The issue of correlation between security and freedom (including the 
extent of intrusion into privacy) allows us to determine boundaries for developing various 
technologies connected with ensuring security under ethical principles and in the spirit of in-
ternational human rights. 
Originality/Value:  Among publications devoted to the difficult relation between security and 
civil liberties, only a small number pertains to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Besides, the 
epidemic period has revealed to an even greater extent, the tendency to impose greater control 
over society through various information technology tools and new technologies.  
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The issue of the relationship between security and freedom is one of the most im-
portant contemporary ethical dilemmas. The discussion on this topic contributes to 
defining the limits of the development of technologies for ensuring protection and 
comfort in the context of moral norms and, in the spirit of international human rights, 
recognized as a key value in democratic states. This dilemma is especially important 
in the era of technological transformations affecting all areas of human life. Our eve-
ryday, biological reality is constantly intertwined with functioning in the digital world 
(in the Internet network). We are constantly accompanied by electrical devices that 
record activity, interests, social relationships, or where we are. The collected data is 
used to create profiles of their users, based on which private companies prepare indi-
vidual commercial offers.  
 
Most of the highly developed countries agree to this state because the services offered 
through this information exchange significantly improve the quality of life and even 
help make decisions (e.g., consumer decisions). Our tendency to openness is therefore 
used by private entities interested in profit. Nevertheless, this data can also be and is 
often used by internal and external security services. The argument that justifies this 
practice is the increase in the effectiveness of protecting citizens against danger. Such 
a motive is often organized crime and terrorism, and recently also the threat resulting 
from the spread of the Covid-19 epidemic. 
 
The purpose of this article is to present and evaluate the methods and information 
technologies used for the control and surveillance of citizens, in the light of, inter alia, 
measures taken to combat the development of the Covid-19 pandemic. As part of this 
assessment, the aspect of the right to privacy will be considered, which seems not to 
be respected by both private market entities and public services. The article attempts 
to indicate the importance of privacy for civil liberties and in the context of building 
a democratic society. The methods used to track Internet users' actions and owners of 
mobile communication devices will also be presented here. New solutions in this area 
that have emerged with the expansion of the global pandemic will be indicated. Their 
presentation will take place in the context of the effectiveness of the fight against the 
threat and the context of potential social consequences. 
 
2. Understanding the Concept of Privacy  
 
"Privacy" is a difficult term to define. While we understand this word's idea, we often 
fail to express its utilitarian scope and meaning comprehensively. Privacy is multidi-
mensional. It covers many spheres of life - including psychological, social, and legal. 
The term is also understood differently depending on regions or countries, shaped dif-
ferently from the historical and cultural perspective.  
 




Its modern European understanding can be derived from antiquity when the civiliza-
tion of the old continent was formed. At that time, it was understood as an attribute of 
free persons. Here is the ancient Roman adjective "private" (private) denoted personal 
property or a person not performing a public function. Its etiology, however, was the 
concept of prices, meaning "free from one's own, single" (Lewis and Short, 1879). 
The French philosopher Benjamin Constant, who developed the interpretation of this 
issue in modern times, also linked "privacy" to freedom. According to him, human 
life should be divided into public and private spheres. Furthermore, it is the right of 
an individual to have this space free from interference by authorities or other persons 
based on human freedom. This privacy is supposed to result in the freedom to dispose 
of one's own political and religious beliefs or the possibility of association.  
 
According to Constant, privacy understood in this way should be guaranteed to every 
citizen (Lumowa, 2010). Similarly, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890) were 
the first to formulate the "right to privacy" principle in an identically titled article 
published in 1890 in the Harvard Law Review. They demanded every human be 
granted the right to "be let alone". 
 
The idea of the legal protection of privacy was finally reflected in the legal provisions 
in the past century, becoming one of the fundamental norms enjoyed by human beings. 
Here it was made one of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights principles, in 
which article 12 states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and repu-
tation." Moreover, "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference and attacks." Likewise, in the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Article 17 indicates that "no one shall be exposed to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his private life, family, home or correspondence, or to any unlawful 
attacks on his honor and reputation."  
 
In turn, according to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (Article 8), "everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence". Following international law, the prin-
ciple of privacy protection has also become present in the regulations of supranational 
institutions such as the European Union (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and 
democratic rules of law. Thus, the right to privacy concept gained importance as one 
of the fundamental attributes of a free man, universally recognized in the world. 
 
3. Contemporary Depreciation of the Importance of Privacy 
 
The very need for privacy manifests itself inconsistently, depending on cultural influ-
ences and individual preferences. It can also take many forms. A specific manifesta-
tion of privacy protection is the decision to cover its own body and select its parts that 
can be exposed. In the still recent past, it was considered that almost every part of the 
body's exposure, perhaps excluding the face and neck, was too bold. Even the hair - 
especially women - should remain covered (Morris, 2004). To this day, some cultures 
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include in the privacy zone, the appearance that is almost completely hidden - as in 
the case of, e.g., some factions of Islam or Judaism (e.g., Hasidism). 
 
More often, however, privacy was associated with keeping strangers from entering 
houses and preventing outsiders from accessing their correspondence. In both cases, 
violation of these spheres was unacceptable - both by ordinary citizens and by institu-
tions and services representing the state. This was expressed in numerous legal provi-
sions. The persistent violation of our personal rights has become a stalking offense 
(Sheridan and Arianayagam and Chan, 2019).  
 
Furthermore, to gain access to private correspondence or the interior of the taxpayers' 
house, the services had to obtain the consent of independent judicial authorities after 
prior exhaustive justification of such a need (primarily for the sake of the public good). 
The United States, in particular, had become famous, over the past century, for re-
specting these principles, especially when they applied to its citizens. Simultaneously, 
there was a strong need to protect this privacy among the population, manifested, for 
example, by the general care for securing postal items and letters, while ensuring their 
confidentiality by courier companies (Desai, 2007). 
 
However, an attitude towards privacy has changed significantly over the past five dec-
ades. The transformation took place with the development of the idea of liberalism 
and technological progress. At first, it started with a loosening of the approach to 
clothing and reduced subsequent elements considered unnecessary. This is the ac-
ceptance of freeing the body from the clothes that cover it, has evolved along with the 
emergence of subsequent moral and fashion revolutions - from hippie freedom in the 
sixties and seventies, through breaking new barriers by music and film stars in the last 
two decades of the last century, to the almost abolition of the taboo undress in the 
present age. This process was accompanied by a change in other levels of morality.  
 
There was a tendency to make information about personal and family life public. The 
popularity of reality TV programs increased people's natural tendency to spy on them 
and created a fashion for a kind of social exhibitionism. This was accompanied by the 
emergence of a new category of idols - celebrities are known only for being publicly 
visible. These personalities were followed by many imitators who wished to become 
famous by showing their interests and everyday life to strangers. The development 
and dissemination of Internet technologies strongly supported this process. Thanks to 
portals such as YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, it has become possible to report 
on one's own life. On the other hand, mobile phone development into a miniature 
computer allowed interested parties to keep track of such information. 
 
This openness and tendency to social exhibitionism have become a permanent element 
of the still shaping of global culture. Attitudes towards privacy vary from generation 
to generation, but there tends to be more open in this aspect among young people. 




They cannot imagine life without a mobile phone by the side, without a personal pro-
file on Facebook (or another social networking site), without connections via instant 
messaging, or without platforms where you can share private photos or videos. It is a 
sign of the overwhelming influence of technology on our lives and culture. However, 
this openness on the Internet is accompanied by numerous threats resulting from an 
unauthorized violation of privacy and the use of the information obtained against its 
owners. Threats - it should be mentioned - are not always aware of and often accepted 
as a kind of payment for the facilities resulting from the possibility of using new tech-
nologies and information solutions. 
 
4.  Privacy towards Websites 
 
In fact, the price we pay for "free" access to websites is our data. However, techno-
logical progress allows us to "be online" around the clock, which is associated with 
the continuous sharing of personal information. Such a situation brings both benefits 
and threats. In the age of the Internet, most matters can be done with one click - paying 
bills, contacting friends, or buying a ticket. However, this comes at a price. Applica-
tions installed on smartphones collect, among others, information such as location, 
sent SMSes, call list, friends list, interests, traveled routes, or visited places. Using 
popular social networking sites allows applications to create our personal profile that 
can both serve and harm users. According to Megapanel PBI / Gemius data from No-
vember 2019, in Poland, "23.4 million internet users have accessed the network via 
personal computers and laptops. 23.8 million used mobile devices for this purpose, 
while 23.4 million internet consumers used smartphones, and 3.1 million browsed the 
web using tablets" (Gemius / PBI, 2019. 
 
One of the popular Internet portals collecting information about users on a large scale 
is Facebook. It turned out to be a leader among the most visited websites in Poland 
(Juza, 2019) and in the world. In its regulations, it lists, inter alia, the following data 
that it collects: "... We collect content, messages and other information received from 
you when using our products (...) We collect information about people, pages, ac-
counts, tags, and groups with which you are connected ( a) and your interactions with 
them in our products, e.g., which people do you communicate most or which groups 
you belong to (...) We collect information about how you use our products (...) when 
you use and when you last used our products, and what posts, videos, and other content 
you display on our products. We also collect information about how you use features 
such as the camera (…) we collect information from computers, telephones, TVs con-
nected to the Internet and other devices connected to the network". Simultaneously, 
ensuring that the collected information is used, inter alia, to personalize functions and 
content. The provision regarding using data such as name, surname, and profile photo 
is very controversial. According to chapter 3, point 2, "You give us consent to use 
your name and profile picture and information about your Facebook activities in ad-
vertising, offers and other sponsored content that we display in or in connection with 
our products without compensation." This is how - in the age of the information soci-
ety - private data has become a commodity. 
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This principle, adequately applied to Facebook, is used by another internet portal - 
Google. The corporation behind processes exorbitant amounts of data users, assuming 
that it is collected to catalog the world's information resources and make them univer-
sally available and useful. Currently, Google is not only a search engine for terms but 
the following related services: 
 
• Google apps, websites, and devices, such as Search, YouTube, and Google 
Home; 
• Platforms such as the Chrome browser and the Android operating system; 
• products integrated into third-party apps and sites, such as ads and embedded 
Google Maps. 
 
The data we provide when creating an account include your first name, last name, and 
password. Optionally, you can add a phone number or payment card details. However, 
Google also collects data such as: "written and received emails, saved photos, and 
videos, created documents and spreadsheets, comments on YouTube videos (...) in-
formation about the applications, browsers and devices with which you use Google 
services (...) a browser type and settings, a device type and settings, operating system, 
cellular data (...) searched terms, watched movies, ads and viewed content together 
with performed interaction, information related to voice and audio while using audio 
functions, purchases, people with whom contacts or materials are shared, activities on 
third-party websites and applications that use Google's services, browsing history in 
chrome synchronized with a Google account". This website's software allows users to 
influence the transfer of information about themselves to some extent; after all, it is 
possible to manage the data to which Google has access. However, in practice, people 
rarely limit the browser's surveillance potential because it also limits the scope of its 
services and the related advantages. At the same time, it does not protect users against 
the potential and real dangers of collecting information. 
 
5. Threats to Privacy on the Internet 
 
Therefore, social networks and applications are collections of data about their users. 
The portals cited above to ensure that they store information about us only to provide 
and improve the services offered, adjust the displayed ads, measure results, or contact 
users. Profiles of website users are created in two ways - with the use of explicit and 
implicit profiling. "Explicit profiling (direct profiling) consists of obtaining infor-
mation directly from the user by filling in a questionnaire. "Implicit profiling" (im-
plicit, indirect) consists of observing user's behavior and reactions" (Olszak and Ol-
szówka, 2007). Many users are unaware of what information they share with social 
networks and how it is later used. Furthermore, even after deleting the accounts, we 
are unsure whether the data is not further stored and processed. 
 
The information itself is not a threat, but it is not always used as it should be. Espe-
cially its careless dissemination becomes a problem. "The intensive development of 




information technologies has revealed or intensified numerous negative phenomena, 
which are induced by the ease of obtaining and distributing information using elec-
tronic devices" (Tomczyk and Mider and Grzegorczyk, 2019). Information collected 
and used is applied by hackers, private companies, and secret services. The most seri-
ous threat seems to be its theft and use to our disadvantage. Moreover, even the largest 
websites (Facebook, Google) could not avoid losing the information they collected, 
as evidenced by the examples below. 
 
One of the largest data leaks from Facebook took place in 2014 when the website 
disclosed information to Cambridge Analytica, an analytical company without users' 
consent. The sale of data reached even 87 million people. It was not the only data leak. 
In October 2018, a security vulnerability allowed hackers to steal information such as 
names, contact details, locations, and 29 million people's birthdays. Another example 
of a data release from Facebook is purchasing information about one million users for 
$ 5 by the Bulgarian blogger Bogomil Shopov in 2012 (Shopov, 2012). The last large 
data leak from this portal took place in December 2019. At that time, information 
related to over 267 million accounts. Access to the database was quickly blocked, but 
information about users was duplicated and made available on one of the hacker fo-
rums. 
 
In turn, Google struggled with one of the largest data leaks in 2015-2018. At that time, 
data on half a million people, such as user's name and surname, email addresses, date 
of birth, gender, profile picture, place of residence, profession, and relationship status, 
could have been released from the Google + portal (currently available only for busi-
ness accounts). Another data loss took place shortly after this incident. This time it 
concerned 52.5 million users of the aforementioned portal. 
 
In early 2019, there was another significant data leak, this time from other Internet 
service providers. One of the hackers' forums could buy a database with 21 million 
passwords and 773 million email addresses from over 2,000 websites. With regular 
updates, the database called "Collection # 1" was available for $ 45. However, in Oc-
tober 2019, there was a leak of the popular music application's user base - Spotify. 
There were 25 thousand people in the publicly available database, email, and account 
passwords. 
 
So, it is easy to see that the Internet is not a safe place. To complete the picture of 
threats resulting from criminal activity within it, it is enough to quote statistical data 
on offenses in a selected country, e.g., Poland. In 2018, CERT Polska operators re-
ceived 19,439 notifications of security incidents. 431 of them concerning offensive, 
illegal content, 862 - malware, 101 - information gathering through scanning, wire-
tapping, social engineering, and others, 153 - intrusion attempts, 125 - intrusions, 49 
- resource availability, 46 - information security attack, 1,878 - computer frauds such 
as identity theft, spoofing or phishing, 69 - vulnerable services, 25 - other (NASK / 
CERT Polska, 2019). The scale of these activities shows how our private data can get 
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into the possession of unwanted people. Nevertheless, not only criminals are interested 
in information about Internet users. 
 
In addition to numerous data theft cases collected by websites, there have been cases 
of its deliberate sharing - primarily with government services and institutions. It is 
worth mentioning here, for example, the PRISM program, under which the National 
Security Agency of the United States collects Internet data about users. PRISM began 
operating in 2007 after the Protect America Act of 2007 was passed under the admin-
istration of President George W. Bush. The project's availability was not disclosed to 
the public, and information about it was leaked after nearly 6 years of operation. Ed-
ward Snowden contributed to that occurrence. The Theesystem's participants out to 
be such forms as Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, YouTube, AOL, 
Skype, and Apple - most of the portals issued statements contradicting their coopera-
tion with PRISM. According to the scope of the program, it can supervise live com-
munication and stored information. This includes, but is not limited to, emails, video 
conferences, voice chats, photos, and file transfers. 
 
Most countries' intelligence services show the will to perform surveillance over citi-
zens by collecting and analyzing information about them. China, where omnipresent 
surveillance is carried out openly and ruthlessly, is the farthest in this respect. The 
project of this oversight was perversely called the Social Credit System. Hence, each 
resident is constantly assessed for his/her daily activity, receiving a certain number of 
points that can be lost or gained depending on his/her actions. The number of points 
rises along with taking actions determined by the authorities as desirable, while any 
offenses against the established order will reduce it.  
 
These points significantly impact the quality of life - they determine the ability to 
move, the conditions for obtaining loans from banks, taking up education, or a profes-
sional or political career. Data collected on followed people is stored through digital 
technology. The system sucks information from social networks and assesses the over-
all activity on the Internet (e.g., based on IP), documents the use of payment cards and 
bank accounts, applications on communication devices, and even collect information 
(based on biometric features) from a network of cameras located in various parts of 
the country. 
 
The Social Trust System serves to increase the security of the state and its citizens 
(e.g., economic security through improved checking of creditworthiness). In fact, 
however, it is a solution that increases control over the inhabitants and subordinates 
them to the authorities, strengthening their integrity. Although this solution is widely 
criticized, many states, to some extent, seek similar control over the citizen. The pre-
text of security has become the best argument to justify violating people's freedom 
and privacy. It is especially useful in situations of fear caused by a real threat. Recently 
it was terrorism, and now this function is performed by the SARS-CoV-2 virus pan-
demic. 




6. Privacy in Times of Pandemic - Digital Methods of Controlling  
the Development of the Disease  
 
Here, along with the development of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was decided to use 
the potential of mobile applications to control the spread of the virus. In stores such 
as the App Store or Google Play, applications whose main task was to control and 
track the pandemic's development began to appear. Depending on the needs of a given 
country, the application has various defined tasks and rights. Some of them monitor 
the health condition, warn about a potential threat, control compliance with the im-
posed quarantine, check users' movement, or possible contact with infected people. 
 
One of the first countries to use technological advances to fight the pandemic was the 
aforementioned China, which applied existing social control models for this purpose. 
They use both city monitoring systems and drones and robots that use detection and 
identification technology to track down people who do not wear masks and show 
symptoms of virus infection (Mehta, 2020). One of the mobile applications operating 
in China is Alipay Health Code. It contains a QR code specifying the user's health by 
giving him/her one of three colors: green, yellow, and red.  
 
Healthy people are marked with the first of these colors. The yellow means the user 
that may be asked to stay home for a week. Red color indicates those who are in a 
two-week quarantine. Yellow or red color can be assigned if the user had contact with 
an infected person, stayed in a high-risk zone, or reported the disease's symptoms in 
the form during registration. In a way, this application is obligatory - whoever does 
not have it has certain restrictions: he/she cannot enter offices, use public transport, 
move freely around the city, go to work, go shopping in shopping centers, or use res-
taurants. However, this program raises concerns for its users, as the collected data is 
transferred to the police. This, in turn, raises the suspicion that the application - under 
the pretext of ensuring health safety - is implementing the next stage of public surveil-
lance. 
 
Another Asian country that has introduced digital social control methods, motivated 
by fighting the pandemic, is South Korea. Its Corona100m enables ongoing monitor-
ing of people quarantined by the authorities. Each user of the application can check 
whether infected people have broken the quarantine rules, and if an infected person is 
within 100m, an alarm is triggered. Another application operating in the country is the 
Self-quarantine safety protection implemented by the government. It is intended to 
make it easier for quarantined users to contact social workers. At the same time, it 
uses GPS to monitor compliance with the imposed quarantine. The app is a must for 
Koreans and foreigners (Lee and Lee, 2020).  
 
One of South Korea's ideas to facilitate the fight against COVID-19 was also the in-
tention to implement a system using data such as camera recordings or cashless trans-
actions. The Korean Alert System for Potentially Infected People is as controversial 
as the Chinese. Messages sent to Koreans allow the identification of infected persons 
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and information about where and when they have been. In many situations, this in-
volves stigmatizing people who have tested positive for COVID-19 while using the 
application because the data disclosed relates to users' personal matters, such as hos-
pital stays or private meetings. 
 
The COVIDSafe application, in turn, operates in Australia, the main tasks of which 
are identifying people at risk of becoming infected with the virus and slowing the 
spread of the coronavirus. From the very beginning, the application aroused contro-
versy in terms of privacy protection. However, the authorities ensure that all data is 
encrypted, the application does not record the location, and that data on contacts with 
other people is only stored for 21 days (Moses et al., 2020). 
 
Discussion on the digital possibilities of supporting the fight against the spread of the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus was also undertaken in Europe. Due to a certain commitment to 
the protection of privacy and human rights, this debate ended with the resolution of 
the European Parliament of April 17, 2020, on coordinated EU action to combat the 
COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences, which allowed the development of appli-
cations to control the spread of disease.  
 
However, under point 52 of this document, their use "shall not be mandatory and that 
the generated data are not be stored in centralized databases". Furthermore, "demands 
that all data storage be decentralized to ensure full transparency of the (non-EU) com-
mercial interests of the developers of these applications and those clear projections be 
demonstrated as regards how the use of contact tracing applications by a part of the 
population, when combined with other specific measures, will lead to a significantly 
lower number of infected people. 'Whereas point 53 notes that "data on the location 
of mobile devices may only be further processed in compliance with the e-Privacy 
Directive and the GDPR; stresses that national and EU authorities must fully comply 
with data protection and privacy legislation, and national data protection authorities 
must provide oversight and guidance."  
 
On May 14, 2020, a plenary debate was held in which it was emphasized that the most 
important thing is that the personal data collected by mobile applications should be 
well secured, and the applications themselves should be non-discriminatory, transpar-
ent, and voluntary (Lietzén, 2020). In response to this provision, many European Un-
ion countries have decided to launch mobile applications. They were, among others, 
Germany, Poland, France, Italy, and Denmark. 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany has therefore launched the Corona-Warn-App, 
which was developed in Berlin by the Institute of Robert Koch (RKI). Its main task is 
to monitor the spread of COVID-19 symptoms throughout the country (Lasarov, 
2020). Installing the program is voluntary, and owners of wristbands and watches that 
monitor health can use it. This application tracks, among other things, the quality of 




sleep, resting pulse, physical activity, and temperature, informing its user about sig-
nificant changes in RKI. All data is encrypted and stored under pseudonyms Corona-
Warn-App. This function has been very successful. Within two weeks of its premiere, 
it was downloaded by 16.6 million users. 
 
There are two applications in Poland Kwarantanna domowa (Home Quarantine) and 
ProteGo Safe. The first is to facilitate quarantine at home. Installing it is obligatory 
for every person who has been officially quarantined. The application allows us to 
confirm the user's location, assess its health, quickly contact the indicated services, 
and report urgent needs to a social welfare center. It also sets out daily tasks, e.g., 
taking a photo proving that a person is in the declared place of quarantine. Data from 
the application is to be stored for a period of 6 years.  
 
The second application - ProteGo Safe - is installed without obligation, and the col-
lected data is used, according to the provider, only to "counter the SARS-CoV-2 virus 
pandemic; profile to counter the SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic; use the Application 
by a person under the Regulations; to do analysis, organization, and improvement of 
ProteGO Safe". The data collected by the program is encrypted and, according to the 
assumptions, cannot be made available in a form that allows the identification of the 
user. Therefore, this solution was created - as its producer announces - mainly to fa-
cilitate self-monitoring of health (e.g., keeping a health diary). The application also 
collects up-to-date data on the pandemic situation. 
 
Another European country that has developed an application to help to counter the 
COVID-19 virus in France. The main task of its StopCovid France was to warn against 
contact with an infected person, which would allow for a quick test and early treat-
ment. The application was released on June 2, 2020. During the first three weeks, 1.9 
million users downloaded it, while only 68 people entered the virus infection data. 
However, according to the available data, the StopCovid France application did not 
achieve the expected effect of mass control of society in the context of the epidemic. 
It was downloaded by only 2% of the population, and during the first three weeks, it 
sent only 14 notifications. 
 
One of the most affected countries in Europe - Italy - has introduced the Immuni ap-
plication that does not rely on a centralized database. During the first ten days of op-
eration, it was downloaded by nearly 2.2 million people (Bogacki, 2020), and after a 
month, this number reached 4 million. The application works by sending information 
to users about the fact that they have had contact with an infected person, which means 
that isolation and testing are recommended. The Italian government ensures that the 
transmitted data is anonymous. 
 
Denmark is another example of a country that has decided to introduce a mobile ap-
plication, in this case, called Smittestopp (Sandvik, 2020). The latest data published 
on June 30, 2020, proves that it was downloaded 619 thousand times. Its main goal is 
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to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. The data collected by the program con-
cern contacts with particular persons, their duration, date, and strength of a signal be-
tween the phones on which it is stored. However, both users of mobile devices and the 
Danish authorities do not have access to this information. All collected data is stored 
on these devices for 14 days. There is, however, a specific problem with this applica-
tion. This is because Denmark keeps the source code of this program secret, giving an 
excuse to distrust potential users. 
 
All of the above-mentioned applications aimed at strengthening the state in preventing 
the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic contain mechanisms of violating their users' 
privacy. They collect data on people's behavior, places of stay, health, relationships 
with other people, and many other aspects of everyday life, which under normal cir-
cumstances, many people still would not want to disclose. There are currently no in-
dications that these programs could be used for commercial purposes (e.g., in the field 
of marketing). However, for the institutions of power of individual countries, they 
remain a valuable source of information about the vast number of citizens. These data 
may tempt governments in the future, for example, to use it to strengthen internal 
security (including intelligence or investigative activities) or even oversight a society.  
 
It is not difficult to imagine when a user of one of these applications will be accused 
of terrorist or criminal activity. Why, in the face of the current trend towards security, 
should the legislative authorities refuse to pass a resolution allowing the use of these 
programs to profile wanted persons and the executive authorities to implement proce-
dures for their use in the prosecution process? After all, there is already an intrusion 
into the privacy of the Internet and mobile devices users, even to a greater extent than 
the potential possibility of using data from the presented COVID-19 applications. Ex-
amples of such surveillance include the US Security Agency's aforementioned PRISM 
program, or the Social Trust System operated in China. Therefore, any violation of 
privacy nowadays should give rise to a reflection, in what direction the development 
of digital technologies is going and how dangerous for an individual is our cultural 
attitude to public exposure of our private life? Our main concern is the theft of our 
data because of hacking. However, we do not see any threats in gathering personal 
information obtained legally. 
 
7. Threats of the Contemporary Depreciation of the Importance of Privacy 
in the Light of Security Needs - Summary 
 
Undoubtedly, the loss of our defining data to unauthorized persons can be fearful. 
First, we imagine the danger of using this information to deprive us of real goods and 
property. After all, hackers can rob us of funds collected in bank accounts, obtain 
loans under our names, or determine when we are away from home without taking 
care of our property. We often lack the awareness that apart from economic threats, 
there are also other, perhaps even more severe ones. 
 




To some extent, users of websites or mobile applications (including those used in the 
combat against COVID-19) also know that making public hidden private information 
may have serious social and personal consequences. In many countries worldwide, 
there have been cases of tragic disclosures of hidden secrets leading to depression, 
alienation, or even self-abuse (Lopez-Agudo, 2020). Especially young people and 
teenagers - not always sure of their value and susceptible to the social environment's 
influence - easily become victims of the so-called "Internet haterage". The more they 
are exposed to the risk of violating their privacy when, in their loneliness, they seek 
contact with other people on social networks. Psychologists have already noticed that 
presence on the Internet causes disturbing personality consequences, such as "internal 
compulsion to be online; escape from the real world to the artificial virtual world; 
access to pathological cultural groups; alienation (e.g., telework alienates)" 
(Furmanek, 2014).  
 
However, after all, disclosing private information can be used to damage the reputa-
tion of just anyone. Even if not by publishing real hidden secrets, it is through the 
skillful manipulation of falsehood and creating an untrue, but the victim's equally de-
structive image. Information and disinformation management may, in fact, translate 
into a more serious threat because of its mass dimension. 
 
After all, it is rarely noticed that threats to our privacy violations on the Internet also 
have a political or even philosophical context. The latter is primarily related to the 
considerations quoted at the beginning of this text and related to the reflections of 
Benjamin Constant. After all, if privacy - as the thinker claimed - is the mainstay of 
freedom, then isn't the consent to function in a reality in which this privacy is so easily 
lost or even voluntarily given up, in fact, being forced into a kind of virtual bondage? 
If government services, private corporations, or hackers gain access to our most hid-
den secrets, they can easily force us to act against our will. We do not even have to be 
aware of it. We already know the case of using social networking sites to manipulate 
information and direct numerous recipients to make political choices in line with the 
manipulator's intention. This is the case of the aforementioned scandal involving Cam-
bridge Analytica, which cataloged and imposed on its users’ content via Facebook 
that was to influence their decisions during the last presidential election in the United 
States.  
 
Thus, the ultimate principle of freedom of choice, a fundamental feature of democratic 
states, was violated. Will such manipulations become a permanent element in the pro-
cess of electing democratic authorities in the future? In the face of this, can we still 
talk about ourselves as free people if we do not make our own decisions due to the 
influence of technology supported by information about ourselves? 
 
In this context, it is also worth considering whether private companies have tools to 
influence citizens; why should not governments use similar solutions? Especially 
when it is an authoritarian or tending towards authoritarianism power. The prerequi-
site for such concerns is, for example, China's surveillance activities as a part of the 
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Social Trust System they have implemented. This project proves that the world al-
ready has the technology of multi-level surveillance of society. Some states decide to 
a greater or lesser extent to introduce similar solutions to social control. For now, the 
pretext for this is primarily security and public order. However, how far will we go in 
this way to eliminate the threats? Today, it is the pandemic of a dangerous disease that 
causes deeper surveillance of societies to, e.g., faster detect pathogen transmission 
sources? However, it is worth remembering that every time we agree to give up some 
part of our privacy - even for the noble purpose of improving general security - we are 
giving up a little bit of our freedom and freedom of choice. Therefore, we should 
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